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MACHINE PROTECTION SYSTEM(S) 
 AN OVERVIEW 
- BY R. SCHMIDT. 
The comments and questions from the audience 
concerned in particular the relationship between the beam 
interlock and power interlock systems and their interfaces 
with various other equipment, such as the QPS, the power 
converters and the beam dumps.  
In particular, the speaker stressed the role of the foreseen 
hardwired signals ensuring safe beam aborts and magnetic 
energy extraction in case of quenches, component 
breakdowns and mains failures.  
The need to have the beam kicked out prior to current 
decay in the magnetic elements was emphasized. This is 
an important issue in the case of the warm magnets with 
small time constant, such as D1. For the superconducting 
chains the topics becomes vital in the cases where the 
energy extraction systems is activated and the DC 
switches deviate the excitation current into the dump 
resistors for a de-excitation with relatively low time-
constant. This case was used by the speaker to illustrate 
the need for coherence across the systems and, in details, 
how the two interlock chains interact to ensure the correct 
abort sequence.  
It was noted, that a number of machine protection 
parameters will have to be revised for operation with lead 
ions. 
The use of the BCT’s as a tool for machine protection was 
mentioned. However, in this context reliability and 
bandwidth limitations are issues of concern. 
COLLIMATORS AND BEAM ABSORBERS 
FOR CLEANING AND MACHINE 
PROTECTION 
- BY R. ASSMANN 
The comments and reactions mainly concerned functional 
aspects. The impact of the collimators on various machine 
parameters was highlighted. For the longitudinal 
impedance, measurements are still to be made in the SPS. 
The compatibility between the use of the collimator 
system for protection of the triplets and at the same time 
playing a role for the reduction of the background in the 
experiments was questioned. K. Potter pointed out that 
the background in the LHC experiments mainly originates 
from beam-gas collisions and that it is the mandate of his 
group to provide the necessary equipment for background 
cleaning. 
The handling of used, radioactive collimators in case of 
manual interventions was questioned. The design of the 
absorber blocks and the driving mechanisms has been 
made so to assure a rapid removal. The disconnection of a 
set of collimator jaws should not take more than a few 
minutes.  
Robustness has been a further design criterion for the 
TCC’s. A single spare should, therefore, be sufficient. 
LHC APERTURE AND COMMISSIONING 
OF THE COLLIMATOR SYSTEM 
- BY S. RADAELLI. 
The presented study of the collimation efficiency and the 
beam loss distribution downstream of the collimators, 
mainly at injection, was based on calculations as well as 
measurements made in the SPS. The orbit simulations 
were made with uncorrected orbits and mostly without 
consideration of imperfections. Field imperfections were 
mentioned as a source of deviation from the presented 
performance. Also collimator imperfection would be 
interesting, but not trivial, to include in further 
evaluations. Finally, the tight tolerances of the β-function 
was mentioned.  
The study has resulted in the determination of a number 
of critical locations, where quenches may occur. The 
number of such places is typically 20-30 and their 
locations are now fairly well defined. 
BEAM INSTRUMENTATION OTHER 
THAN THE BLM’S LINKED TO THE 
MACHINE PROTECTION SYSTEM 
- BY R. JONES. 
Following the presentation of the possible roles, which 
the beam position monitors (BPM’s) and the beam current 
transformers (BCT’s) could play in the protection of the 
LHC against oscillations and fast orbit changes, caused by 
failures such as a D1 switch-off, it was the general 
impression that the BCT, with its absolute measurement, 
may be considered as the ultimate saving element of the 
machine. Particle showers from the collimators through 
the BCT could, however, be a reason for concern. It was 
admitted that shower related calculations are urgently 
required. 
The precise location of the BCT in IR4 seems now to be 
determined. 
For operations with ions, the use of the BLM’s is 
considered marginal, whereas the use of the BCT can be 
vital.  
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COMMISSIONING OF THE 
PROTECTION SYSTEM 
- BY J. WENNINGER. 
With respect to the presented program for commissioning 
of the protection systems prior to injection and beam 
commissioning, a number of remarks were given during 
the discussion of the issue.  
Threshold setting of the BLM’s will be required at the 
first possible occasion as the preliminary calibration with 
radioactive sources needs to be complemented by 
measurements with the LHC beam. And the number and 
identification of those BLM’s required for a safe 
commissioning will need to be determined. The case of a 
trip of the D1 returned to the forefront of the discussion, 
this time as a request for determination of possible test 
procedures for verification of the protection efficiency. 
Although the confidence is high that the four-fold 
redundancy of the BIC will provide sufficient protection a 
provoked test remains an option. The MPWG was 
requested to analyse possible test scenarios and make 
recommendations. 
The unlikely situation of a complete failure of the beam 
dump system was evoked. A very slow scraping of the 
beam could be the only answer. However, this option 
requires some serious checking. 
It was finally pointed out, that even when the powering 
and beam interlock systems will flawlessly fulfil their 
protection role, dangerous situations, occurring as a result 
of man-made mistakes, cannot be ruled-out. In addition to 
this ‘human factor’ comes the fact that the most likely 
critical situations are those which nobody has thought 
about.  
OBJECTS CAPABLE OF TOUCHING THE 
BEAMS  - BY P. COLLIER. 
It was a general surprise that as much as 500 objects will 
be able to hit the LHC beams. Most of these objects are 
specific for each ring while a small number of them are 
common for the two beams.  
Of the equipment presented, the two fast valves of LHCb 
(13 ms closing time) are considered as dangerous and 
interconnected with the beam dump is mandatory. For the 
four wire scanners the interlocking is considered to be 
difficult.  
From the discussion, the following points have been 
retained:  
• The valves in the dump line shall be treated as those 
in the machine.  
• The faster an object is being moved towards the 
beam, the higher is the risk of damage to this 
component. It turned out that the moving speed of a 
few objects is high, thus the reason for concern. 
• The Roman pots of CMS (and most likely also those 
of Atlas) will be moved in at the latest possible 
moment, i.e. just before start of collision data taking. 
• For moving the various objects a coherent approach 
shall be pursued. 
• All movement shall be coordinated from the CCC. It 
is even preferred that movements of objects which 
could present a danger for the LHC machine shall be 
performed from the CCC.  
• All movements shall be monitored with post-mortem 
acquisition. 
WILL WE EVER GET THE GREEN 
LIGHT FOR BEAM OPERATION 
- BY J. UYTHOVEN. 
In the calculated availability figure for the complete 
machine, based on the quantitative failure assessments of 
each individual sub-system, the possible missed attempts 
to fill the LHC have not been included. Such missed 
attempts to inject have been relatively frequent at HERA 
and will add to the predicted 24 false aborts per year of 
operation of the LHC. 
It was pointed out that failure rates vary in time and 
strongly depend on the performed maintenance. As 
example was mentioned the monthly checks in test mode 
of the quench protection (detection and heater firing) and 
energy extraction systems, including the switch-opening-
failure scenario. 
A flawless post mortem acquisition is also here of prime 
importance. 
BEAM LOSS INDUCED QUENCH 
LEVELS  - BY A. SIEMKO. 
From the theoretical part of the presentation interest 
focussed on the quench origin and propagation. It is 
interesting to notice that at top energy the length of the 
resistive part of the conductor for a non-recoverable 
quench is as small as 1 mm.  
Several questions concerned the comparison between 
calculated and observed quench levels in the LHC main 
magnets as well as comparison with the experience from 
operation of other machines, like RHIC and HERA. 
Presentation of results from such comparisons is 
scheduled for the forthcoming workshop on quench levels 
in the LHC. 
In HERA the BLM’s have been calibrated according to 
calculated and experienced loss rates.  
As conductor movements in the LHC main magnet coils 
are more likely to take place in the coil ends rather than in 
the straight part, movement-induced quenches are mainly 
occurring at the extremities of the magnets. It was noted 
that the LHC magnets operate in much more critical 
conditions than the HERA magnets. 
Loss calculations around the LHC are not trivial and exist 
only for a few locations. However, simple estimates in 
mW/cm3 would be welcomed. 
The consequences of a complete sector quench of one of 
the main circuits can have severe consequences. 
Calculations have shown that the maximum reverse 
voltage of a small number of cold diodes may be 
exceeded. Such failure will result in several weeks of 
intervention.  
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DAMAGE LEVELS: COMPARISON OF 
EXPERIMENT AND SIMULATION 
- BY V. KAIN. 
In the proton bombardment experiment with stacks of 
high-Z metal plates (Zn, Cu, AISI 316L), conducted in 
the SPS, only the stainless steel part gave some 
discrepancy between the simulated and experimentally 
observed behaviour. Analysis is still on-going. 
It was pointed out that the results of the experiment can 
be sensitive to the geometry of the target object. The 
results will also be different for different types of 
particles. For heavy ions for instance, damage is expected 
to occur already at the first plates in the stack. 
Bombardment with pions would also be meaningful 
because of the expected showers. 
Only a few days of cool-down were required after the end 
of the test. This information can allow extrapolation for 
other parts to be installed in the LHC. 
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